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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines some of the organizational charac-
teristics that restrict productivity in government organiza-
tions. The beneficial impact of clearly established
organizational objectives on productivity is stressed, and
the theory and practice of Management by Objectives is
reviewed. The purpose of the thesis was to determine if the
techniques of MBO, appropriately utilized, could be expected
to improve the productivity of government organizations, and
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Government managers, in all kinds of organizations, are
under tremendous pressure to reduce costs and improve services
at the same time. Because of the rapid growth in government
services and organizations, there is increased competition -^=*''^
for available resources. In this environment ' i^ is imperative
that government managers objectively and thoroughly examine
the productivity of their organizational units.
There are many reasons why people, working together in
organizations, are not as efficient and effective as they
could be. This thesis examines some of the reasons that are
unique to, or at .least prevalent in, government organizations.
The thesis was written to assist government managers in exam-
ining productivity-related issues in their organizations.
This thesis includes an introduction and review of the
system known as Management by Objectives. The underlying
theory is appealingly simple and is based on two concepts:
(1) the clearer the idea one has of what it is one is trying
to accomplish, the greater the chances for accomplishing it;
and (2) progress can only be measured in terms of what one is
trying to make progress toward. The potential of MBO pro-
grams to increase the productivity of government organizations
is examined.
The purpose of the thesis is to deteirmine if the charac-
teristic capabilities of MBO programs, appropriately tailored

and implemented, can improve the productivity of government




The question of governmental productivity was approached
by analyzing the organizational characteristics that may
exist and that tend to prevent or discourage productivity.
A number of counter-productive characteristics are identified
and described. Organizational reward systems and their poten-
tial impact on productivity are discussed. The author notes
that clarifying organizational objectives is both an essential
prerequisite to productivity and a fundamental feature of MBO.
This effort is based on reading and analyzing material
pertaining to MBO and governmental productivity, discussions
with managers in federal and city government, and the judge-
ment of the author. This thesis is conceptual in nature and
does not attempt to give specific application guides for intro-
ducing MBO into government organizations nor does it attempt
to define one "best" MBO program. It is hoped that this
thesis will assist government managers to determine if imple-
menting an MBO program will increase the productivity of their
organization, and what organizational factors and attributes
may influence successful implementation.
In far too many government organizations effectiveness is
measured by the effort that is expended and the number of
reports generated rather than by results. There are frequent
changes in direction due to the lack of predetermined and
K%

clearly coinmunicated objectives. The waste of scarce public
resources can be curtailed by dedicated professional managers
who are determined to produce concrete and meaningful results. ^ '

II. REVIEW OF MBO
A . BACKGROUND
Management by Objectives is a system of management at the
heart of which is a process whereby the superior and siibordi-
nate arrive at goals for the subordinate which are derived
from or related to the goals of the superior [Tosi, 1973].
MBO involves a clear and precise identification of desired
results, the establishment of a realistic program for their
achievement, and an evaluation of performance in terms of
measured results in achieving them [Morrisey, 19 70].
Peter Drucker, a pioneer in the field of MBO, wrote:
"What the business enterprise needs is a principle of
management that will give full scope to individual
strength and responsibility, and at the same time give
common direction of vision and effort, establish team-
work and harmonize the goals of the individual with the
common weal. The only principle that can do this is
management by objectives and self-control" [Drucker, 1954].
Other well known authors who have written on the subject in-
clude Douglas McGregor, George Odiorne, Charles Hughes,
George Morrisey, John Humble, and Anthony Raia.
The literature of MBO makes many claims about its advan-
tages and benefits to an organization.
"MBO has been credited with clarifying responsibilities,
providing more objective criteria for performance
appraisal, improving planning and control, and improving
superior/subordinate relationships. It has been, depend-
ing on who is using it, an evaluation tool, a method
of organizational analysis, a technique for organizational
development, and a way to increase the participation and
influence of subordinates" [Tosi, 1973].

On the other hand, nearly all the advocates of MBO admit that
good managers have been essentially using MBO for many years
even though some of the specific teirminology and flow of acti-
vities may be relatively new. The logic of MBO is deceptively
simple. Successful implementation, however, can be complex
and difficult and may require changes in organizational reward
systems and fundamental managerial behavior.
Managerial effectiveness is the focus of MBO. Managerial
effectiveness is obviously crucial to the success of any
organization. Reddin states that before a manager can operate
with full effectiveness, he must:
"1. Understand the overall contribution his unit should
make, which means knowing what his superior is
responsible for.
2. Understand his role in his unit, which means knowing
what he is responsible for achieving and knowing
what his superior thinks is a good job.
3. Establish specific objectives which he intends to
achieve in a determined time period.
4. Have the help of his superior in overcoming obstacles
which may prevent the attainment of these objectives.
These obstacles may lie in the organization, the job,
the superior, or the manager himself.
5. Have a willingness to work to achieve his objectives,
which may mean preparedness to change his behavior.
6. Receive concrete periodic feedback on his progress
toward his objectives.
7. Be held responsible for his actions" [Reddin, 1971].
Formal MBO programs began in the late 1950 's and early
1960 's and were, for the most part, designed to improve the
personnel performance appraisal function. The underlying
theory was that managers should be judged on the basis of
10

progress toward agreed-upon goals rather than upon personal
traits. Many executives feel that these programs have been,
for the most part, not as useful as they had expected. A
typical comment runs: "The ideas seemed so valid, but some-
how they have not turned out to be all that we wanted
"
[Wikstrom, 1968]- In other organizations the concepts of MBO
took root and evolved from a performance appraisal tool to a
general approach to managing. In many cases this approach
has led to a very real payoff in creating a better managed
organization.
B. MBO PROCESSES
Depending on the authority cited, the processes involved
in an MBO program can be divided into as many as twelve
separate steps or as few as three. For our purposes we will
consider a typical MBO program as consisting of four phases:
goal setting, action planning, controlling, and reviewing.
1. Goal Setting
The setting of goals or objectives is the most critical
activity in an MBO program. All the authorities agree that
specifying appropriate objectives and explaining them clearly
to others can be very difficult and that it takes time and
creative thinking. Except for the very top level of an organ-
ization, objectives should be stated in quantifiable terms if
at all possible. Statements of general objectives by top
executives are an extremely useful first step in establishing
an integrated network of objectives and in sorting out con-
flicting objectives at lower levels.
11

"There is no doubt that an agreed-upon set of objec-
tives can improve employee performance. Research has
shown that there is no substitute for a definite state-
ment in which a person makes a commitment not only to
others but to himself. Through this commitment, moti-
vation as well as communication is achieved" [Hughes,
1965] .
In organizations that do not have specific objectives
for key areas it is generally assiomed that managers know what
needs to be done. This is often wishful thinking. The lack
of agreed-upon objectives allows, perhaps even encourages, a
manager to form his own ideas and to strive for short-range
parochial gains, frequently to the detriment of the organiza-
tion as a whole.
Much has been written about whether objectives should
be formulated by a top-down or bottom-up process. Many organ-
izations have found that the objective-setting process cannot
be exclusively top-down or bottom-up if it is to be effective.
The communication and planning effort, they find, must go in
both directions [Wikstrom, 1968] . The critical concern is
that when the process is finished the superior and subordinate
are committed to what they both believe to be vital, attain-
able goals.
Some governmental organizations deal in services that
lead readily to clearly understood objectives and tangible
end products. Many government organizations, however, are
not so fortunate. In the Department of Defense, for example,
considerable resources are expended which hopefully lead to
the "improved operational capability" of a weapon system.
Such concepts are admittedly not easily quantified. It would
be a serious error, however, for government managers to
12

conclude lightly that it is not possible to establish explicit
objectives in their area. Even though it may be difficult to
dO/ it is critical that the performance of individual employees
and groups be linked to concrete end results to the maximum
extent possible- The more difficult it is to state clear and
concise objectives, the more likely it is that resources will
be wasted in counter-productive effort.
Such intangible goals as "improving communications"
are difficult to state in measurable terms but it may be pos-
sible to identify specific, measurable activities, which if
accomplished, should lead to the goal. For example, "conduct-
ing individual discussions related to job and personal develop-
ment on a planned schedule of not less than two employees per
week" is a measurable activity which might be pursued in order
to "improve communications" [Morrisey, 1970]. Some creative
effort may be required in stating objectives in a manner that
will facilitate measurement of progress, but it should be well
worth the effort.
A good set of objectives will have the following
characteristics
:
be clear and concise
be quantified to the maximum extent possible
have time dimensions
be mutually agreed-upon
be vital and urgent
support the organization's overall goals
concentrate on what and when, not why and how
be linked to other, related activities
cause individuals to stretch their capabilities
be realistic
be frequently reviewed
concentrate organizational energy on the right activities
enhance productivity and quality
13

A set of objectives, once established, must be viewed
as a dynamic instrument. Static objectives are generally
useless and may even be destructive. The real world changes
rapidly and when certain critical conditions change, it may
well be necessary to change or modify objectives. Objectives
should be reviewed frequently to ensure that they are current





Action planning answers the question, "How will we
achieve the objective?" The plan of action may be simple or
complex depending on the specific objective itself. Because
of chain-of-command relationships, what may be a step in the
action plan at one level of management may be assigned as an
objective for someone at a lower level. The action plan for
a moderately complex objective may be broken down to several
levels of milestones and should show a time schedule and the
resources required. PERT networks and milestones charts are
examples of action plans for complex objectives.
3. Control
Planning, once completed, provides the basis for
focusing attention and energy on performing the right activi-
ties. Controlling encompasses all the things a manager must
do to ensure that the actual work performed matches the action
plan and that resources are only expended to create a planned
end result. Too many managers tend to go to extremes in the
area of controlling. They either exercise no control at all
14

or far more than is necessary. A good MBO .program can aid
a manager in exercising the proper degree of control by making
it explicit why certain activities are being performed and
how they relate to a desired end result.
4 . Review
Managers should establish firm dates to review the pro-
gress that has been made against that which was planned. Fre-
quent review avoids "surprises" and helps to keep the stated
objectives from becoming static and invalid. It also promotes
good communications by providing a meaningful basis for
superior/subordinate discussions. Periodic MBO reviews should
not be confused with employee performance reviews although the
two are certainly related. The MBO review should focus on pro-






Government was the most rapidly growing sector of employ-
ment during the 1960 's. Nearly 13 million people are employed
by government organizations in the U.S. A recent editorial
in the Wall Street Journal (August 2, 19 76) noted that in the
past twenty years the total state and local government payroll
has climbed at three times the annual rate of the private sec-
tor payroll. The editorial states that in New York City
"grocers and small businessmen have closed down and died off,
victims of the crushing tax burden imposed in order to main-
tain the city's teachers, policemen, firemen, and civil ser-
vants." It closes by warning of the "mood of rebellion among
voters and taxpayers .
"
"Public resources are squeezed between expanding public
demands for services and the rising cost of meeting
those needs, on the one hand, and a growing resistance
on the part of the public to provide more resources
through higher taxes, on the other. One answer to this
dilemma is improved productivity" [National Commission
of Productivity, 1973].
There is a great deal of concern about the productivity
of the government sector of our economy and there is general
concensus that governmental productivity should be improved.
The growing size and cost of the government sector forces
those government organizations which are providing valuable
service to the taxpayers into fierce competition for available
tax dollars. It is clearly important that those issues which





The expenditure of resources, by members of an organiza-
tion, which does not support the achievement of organizational
goals is, generally, a waste of those resources. It is not
possible for any organization to be productive unless its
people have a clear understanding of its goals and objectives
and are committed to a plan of action for achieving them.
The question of productivity in any government organization
cannot even be addressed until there is a clear understanding
of its reason for existing. Government managers sometimes
attempt to increase productivity by adding more "organization."
Before taking this approach they should ask, "Exactly what is
it we're trying to accomplish?"
It is not unusual in government organizations to find
marked disagreement among units as to who is supporting whom.
A great deal of inefficiency could be reduced by a clear state-
ment of what piece of the action a specific organizational
unit has. Lacking this understanding, an individual manager
may find himself hard at work pursuing an implicit set of
goals, busily performing activities which make relatively
little contribution to the overall objectives of the organi-
zation, but which he thinks are pleasing to upper management.
Studies have shown that when the boss's expectations are not
met, the simple fact is that generally, the subordinate did
not know what was expected of him [Odiorne, 1965].
Enhancement of productivity is brought about by making
changes in the way resources (inputs) are used, in order to
improve the results (outputs) of organizational efforts.
17

Before we can speak meaningfully of organizational productiv-
ity, or the lack thereof, we need to have a clear understand-
ing of the desired end results of the organization. It is
difficult to establish a clear set of organizational objec-
tives under the best of circumstances. It is especially diffi-
cult in many government organizations. A recent study [Rainey,
1976] found that government organizations, as compared to pri-
vate organizations, tend to exhibit:
greater multiplicity and diversity of objectives
greater vagueness and intangibility of objectives
greater tendency of goals to be conflicting
greater caution and rigidity, less innovativeness —=-^
These findings, rather than being accepted as valid reasons
for inefficient operation, should serve to alert government
managers and challenge them to strive for better clarity of
purpose and integration of effort.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
One of the factors that limits productivity in any large
organization, and particularly in government organizations,
is the existence of complicated procedures designed to pre-
vent mistakes. These procedures tend to become obsolete and
block the development of new plans and ideas , thus limiting
productivity.
"Large organizations strive for control, clarity, and
stability, while managers, particularly creative ones,
fight for autonomy, self-control and change. Finding
the right balance is not easy and failure to do so leads
to either bureaucracy or anarchy" [Humble, 19 70].
Government organizations need to try to find ways to clear
away unnecessary and overly restrictive procedures that block
the introduction of productivity-enhancing changes.

It is a widely accepted principle in management that
managers should not be held responsible for results over
which they have no control. However, in large government
organizations such as the Department of Defense, responsi-
bility is so dispersed that many managers find that they
have sole control of practically nothing. This situation
will lead to counter-productive efforts and general confu-
sion unless there exists a system and a climate which
encourages individual managers to communicate and agree on
responsibility for shared objectives.
Peter Drucker believes that the way in which government
institutions are paid is the basis for any major differences
in performance between private business and government insti-
tutions. Businesses are paid only when they produce what the
customer is willing to pay for. Government institutions, in
contrast, are typically paid out of a budget allocation.
"Efficiency and cost control, however much they are
preached, are not really considered virtues in the
budget-based institution. The importance of a budget-
based institution is measured essentially by the size J>^
of its budget and the size of its staff" [Drucker, 1974]. 'vV^
Drucker does not suggest a better method of funding govern-
ment organizations but he does believe that the inherent
inefficiency can be largely offset through effective
management.
One author speaks of management by "controls" [Hughes,
1965], another refers to management by "activity" [Morrisey,
1970]. Both are referring to the misplaced emphasis on what
people are doing, rather than on why they are doing it; on
19

tasks rather than goals. This approach to ' management is
found in many government organizations. With this approach
it is easy to camouflage failure. Most job descriptions in
government tend to emphasize activities or duties rather than
results. A long, all-inclusive list of duties does nothing
to communicate what results are expected and may actually
steer the individual away from final results [Schleh, 1961].
No amount of "motivation" can produce satisfactory results in
the absence of clear and mutually accepted goals. Government
managers must continually remind themselves and their subor-
dinates that it is results that count.
In the private sector the desired output of nearly all
the organizational subunits is related to profit. A manager
who has observed both public and private organization at
close range remarked, "The profit motive aids in resolving
issues in executive meetings in the private sector. Proposals
and points of view are judged ultimately on their profit con-
tribution. I have seen issues resolved rapidly in this manner
that would have taken much longer to resolve in the Federal
Government" [Olson, 1976]. The crucible of the market place
refines business organizations, forcing them to stay (or
become) productive. Businesses that are unresponsive or waste- v^'
ful soon cease to exist. Government organizations, on the
other hand, are not eliminated by any comparable forces when
they become inefficient or ineffective.
20

C. ORGANIZATIONAL REWARD SYSTEMS
Managers in government frequently spend a great deal of
time, energy, and imagination convincing their superiors that
they need a bigger budget and more people to do their job.
They frequently ask for, and attempt to justify, twice as
much money as they expect to receive, knowing that their asking
figure will be trimmed by half no matter how worthy the origi-
nal figure was. Near the end of the budget year, managers
make an extra effort to spend what is left over lest the sur-
plus indicate that the total sum wasn't really needed and that
next year's budget should be lowered accordingly. A chief
reason for this "empire building" approach is that promotions
and rewards for managers are frequently perceived to be based
on budget size and organizational growth. The control of ever
bigger annual budgets is a widely recognized, although unpub-
licized, criterion of executive potential in government
organizations
.
In an ideal situation, behavior that leads to increased
productivity and moves an organization in the direction of its
overall goals would be rewarded. If this were true, then the
search for increased productivity would be reinforced by
rewarding those who are most productive or who cause produc-
tivity to improve. We will therefore define the ideal reward
system as a system which encourages the individuals in an
organization to behave in a manner that supports the efficient
production of the organization's desired outputs. This
encouragement would come in the form of rewards that serve
21

as motivators. If, on the other hand, we were to examine
those managers that succeeded, that rose rapidly in any
organization, we could possibly determine why they actually
were rewarded. The characteristics or behavior that is, in
fact, rewarded would provide the key to the organization's
real reward system.
There are no profit sharing plans in government and
salaries are strictly limited by law. Given that salary is
viewed as adequate, money is not a significant motivator for
most government managers. What are some of the potential
rewards that motivate government managers? Figure 1 lists
some rewards as expressed by a group of high potential, mid-
level federal managers at a recent seminar [Brumley, 1976].
The rewards listed in figure 1 are things they considered
worth striving for. In an ideal reward system, behavior
such as that described in the first column of figure 2 would
lead to the desired rewards for individuals, and would at the
same time enhance the productivity of the organization.
Column 2 lists some characteristics or behavior that these
individuals perceived to be valued in their organizations.
As can be seen, the real reward system, in this case, could
not be expected to increase organizational productivity. If
figures 1 and 2 accurately depict the real reward system in
government organizations, it should not be surprising that
productivity is not as great as it might be.
The items listed in figures 1 and 2 are not in any order














Doing right things Bringing in
well money
Paying attention to Personality,
customer needs appearance
Cost cutting Public speaking
Reducing staff size Peer recognition
Improving efficiency. Recognized "expert"
effectiveness Seniority




are simply intended to stimulate the reader to think about
how to identify the characteristics and implications of organ-
izational reward systems. It may take a great deal of time
to change the operation of a counter-productive reward system.
The first step is to recognize its existence.
Inflated staffing plans, inflated budgets, and counter-
productive reward systems hardly encourage efficiency. What
does this have to do with MBO? Simply this, if government
managers had agreed-upon statements of roles, missions, and
objectives, they would have a basis for making cost effective -~-^
decisions, and this in turn could lead to a better basis for
judging and rewarding managerial performance. A system that
defines what a manager is responsible for, in concrete terms,
and follows up on progress, is essential in any efficient
organization
.
It is of the utmost importance that the productivity of^i---^
government organizations in our society be improved. To do ^
this we must examine carefully the characteristics of govern-
ment organizations and understand the implications that those
characteristics have on productivity. We must then utilize
carefully tailored management methods that will lead to more
effective utilization of scarce resources. Informed govern-
ment managers, determined to produce meaningful results, and
armed with systematic techniques, can improve productivity




A. THE RANGE OF MBO PROGRAMS
Based on a review of the principles and techniques of
MBO, and an examination of the unique managerial needs of
government organizations, it appears that a wider application
of MBO in government organizations would be appropriate.
Even though there are significant differences between govern-
ment and business organizations, government managers who are
interested in applying the techniques of MBO can learn some
valuable lessons from the successes and failures in private
industry. There is sufficient experience available to avoid
a disappointing and abortive attempt at MBO. The range of
programs extends from very elaborate, formal systems with
heavy reporting requirements to very simple systems in which
individual managers are essentially free to implement as they
see fit. They range from highly successful to complete
failure. The more successful programs are viewed by those
involved as a way of managing, not as an addition to the mana-
ger's job.
General Mills, Inc., introduced an MBO performance ap-
praisal program in 19 54. The effort was viewed by managers
as "a personnel program" and the results were disappointing.
However, the concepts of MBO were picked up by some top man-
agers and the emphasis shifted in the late fifties to an
integrated planning and control system. MBO has become a way
of doing business at General Mills [Wikstrom, 1968].
25

One of the more informal MBO programs was designed for
the Wells Fargo Bank. Initially emphasis was placed on
training management personnel in the techniques and potential
benefits. Individual managers were allowed to judge for them-
selves whether or not MBO was applicable to their particular
group and, if so, company support and services were provided.
Support included third-party consultation and assistance in
the objective-setting process. Wells Fargo decided against
a preordained or "set" program and emphasized how the process
could meet the needs of their managers, not what ought to be
done. They opted for a flexible, pragmatic, user-oriented,
long-term (3 to 5 years) approach [Lasagna, 1971].
B. BENEFITS AND PITFALLS
The concepts of MBO essentially represent a pragmatic
approach to the normal management functions of planning and
control. A primary benefit of MBO is the degree of rigor
which is introduced into the planning and control functions.
If it is felt that additional rigor is needed in these areas,
then MBO could be useful. More rigorous control plus the
additional commitment which is possible through the applica-
tion of MBO, results in managers being more likely to achieve
whatever they set out to achieve.
"Many men who have had several years experience planning
under an MBO program admit that they had not really
thought in terms of end results before they began to set
objectives for their work. Because they were accustomed
to working, they thought in terms of work, not results.
In fact, they equated the two— results were what you got
if you worked hard enough. Now they think of the desired
26

results first and then decide what work will be needed
to achieve them. The difference is subtle, they say,
and one that can be learned only from experience" [Wikstrom,
1968] .
The prospective user of MBO should be aware of the prob-
lems that can occur. Some proponents of MBO have a tendency
to sweep aside the negative reactions of participants. Fre-
quently heard complaints include:
MBO is used as a whip
It increases the amount of paperwork in the system
Too much time is spent counseling with subordinates
Superiors demand stated goals in all areas and this is
impossible
Spontaneous requirements are not recognized
Not enough emphasis is placed on the changing needs of
management
It is just an appendage to the administrative system.
Steering away from these problems during the design and imple-
mentation phases will increase the probability of success of
a program.
There is a strong temptation, in the design phase, to try
to develop a program that will do everything for everybody.
Unless this temptation is strongly resisted, disaster can be
assured. Attempting to accomplish too much, too soon, is
one of the major reasons for problems when trying to implement
any broad, organization-wide program in a large organization.
Nothing kills a good idea faster than to institutionalize it.
One experienced MBO specialist said, not too facetiously, "The
effectiveness of an MBO program is inversely proportional to
the number of MBO forms."
A major problem in intelligent program design is deciding
where not to apply MBO. Trying to apply a program to every
27

job in an organization may be a mistake. No position or job
should be included in an MBO program unless:
the employee has significant assets under his control
the employee exercises discretion over the inputs and
outputs of his position
the organization's overall effectiveness would benefit
from better planning and controlling by the employee.
If the individual knows what he needs to do and is doing a
good job, leave him alone 1
Some organizations have attempted to extend their MBO pro-
grams to areas where their employees are performing more-or-
less routine maintenance or production functions. This is not
a sensible application of MBO and usually leads to the opposite
result from what was intended. Employees who have little or
no discretion over what they do, tend to become frustrated
when MBO is forced on them. Conferences between superior and
subordinate for the purpose of setting objectives or appraising
performance frequently lead to disappointment on both sides.
The superior thinks the employee is non-cooperative and the
employee thinks, "Why doesn't he leave me alone and let me get
my work done?" The real problem is an inappropriate applica-
tion of MBO. Careful attention should be given to limiting
an MBO program to only those positions where it makes sense.
C. IMPLEMENTING MBO
It is imperative that managers take a far-sighted view
when introducing MBO. Overnight results are not the rule.
This is a particularly critical consideration in government
organizations since policy makers tend to have rather short
28

time horizons. Budget cycles and major program' reviews are
generally annual. Tours of duty of military officers tend
to be 2 years in length. There is often a rapid turnover in
high level government managers. These and other factors tend
to hinder long-range planning in government organizations.
Most authorities agree that 3 to 5 years is not an unusual
length of time to establish a worthwhile, functioning MBO
program.
As in any new management program, the full support and
confident expectations of the highest applicable level of
management is- crucial to the success of an MBO program. No
organization should try to introduce MBO unless m.anagement
is truly committed to a long-term effort to make it work.
Not only must top management be involved in defining the ob-
jectives of the organization, but they must also be receptive
to comments, criticisms, and suggestions from their subor-
dinates [Humble, 1972].
Most successful MBO programs have required an advisor or
a team of advisors to help get the program started. If the
advisor is of the highest caliber and is respected within the
organization, then management has done a great deal to show
its support. The advisor can be an outsider or an insider
but he must be able to communicate the techniques of MBO and
he must be able to facilitate changes in the relationships be-
tween people [Humble, 1972].
The use of MBO in government organizations is essentially
a new field. Limited experience has shown that this application
29

requires new perceptions. Business experience is transfer-
able only when carefully tailored to fit the different en-
vironment. Provided the fundamental concepts of MBO are
refined to meet the special circumstances, the benefits to




There are no short cuts, no easy methods for increasing
productivity in government organizations. A "cookbook"
application of MBO or any other systematic management program
will surely result in frustration and disappointment. "There
is no one best way to manage by objectives!" [Raia, 1974].
Each program must be carefully tailored to the particular
characteristics and needs of individual organizational units.
If top management expects rapid implementation and uniform
application of a highly structured program, they will probably
eventually conclude that the effort expended on MBO was a
waste of time. However, MBO techniques, intelligently util-
ized, can help government managers clarify issues, eliminate
waste, and focus on results. MBO programs should not be
applied in areas where employees have no significant assets
under their control or very little discretion with regard to
the output of their job.
The key to productivity in any organization is managerial
effectiveness. Provided the necessary environmental factors
are present, and with strong management commitment, MBO can
improve the managerial effectiveness of an organization.
Special attention is required in government due to the fact
that keen competition and the profit motive, which tend to
keep private business organizations efficient, are lacking.
The first step for a government organizational unit desiring
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to increase its productivity is to establish clearly, con-
cisely, and in writing, what its overall objectives are.
A critical environmental factor in government for a suc-
cesful MBO program is the absence of counter-productive
reward systems. Employees at all levels in an organization
must be convinced, by example, that behavior leading to im-
proved efficiency and productivity is indeed valued and
rewarded. This is a consideration that should not be taken
lightly.
"MBO avoids subjective evaluation; personality plays
a less important role. MBO assumes that managerial
behavior is more important than personality and that
behavior should be defined in terms of results measured
against established goals" [Odiome, 1965].
MBO can produce beneficial results in an organization only if
the assumptions stated by Odiorne are, in fact, true.
The techniques of MBO focus on some of the same issues
that often impair the effectiveness of government organiza-
tions. The match between the management needs of government
organizations and the inherent capabilities and potential
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